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technical tasks in environmental policy and defense. There are, however, serious problems such as the IRS's cancellation of its Check Handling Enhancements and Expert System (CHEXS) after severe criticism from the Government Accounting Office (GAO) because of project mismanagement (Quindlen 1992) . Although his study focused on provate sector applications, Gill (1995) found over 66 percent of the expert systems that were developed in the late 1980s were abandoned within five years. While there are other, relatively new information technologies with higher diffusion rates (Fletcher, Bretschneider, and Marchand 1992) , the high costs and possibly exaggerated benefits require research clarifying the case study findings.
Relatively little research outside the case study literature directly evaluates the use of expert systems in decision making. This is partly attributable to the traditional view of management information systems (MIS) researchers that expert systems are simply a subset of decision support systems (Davis and Olson 1985) . A decision support system (DSS) is designed specifically to support decision makers in areas where they have been shown to perform poorly, such as in underutilizing base rate information (Meehl and Rosen 1955) ; ignoring fundamental principles of sampling (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) ; showing an inability to improve predictive accuracy with increased amounts of information (Oskamp 1965, and compare Sage 1981; Tversky and Kahneman 1974) . ESs and DSSs are similar in that they assist with less structured problems and target improved decisionmaking quality, efficiency, and consistency. However, it is generally argued that DSSs do not form conclusions but simply supply information to decision makers (Efroymson and Phillips 1987) unlike some ESs. DSSs usually require quantification of a problem while expert systems rely on heuristic reasoning. Hence it is argued the ES is often more suitable than the DSS for illstructured problems. This is significant since it is commonly asserted that computerized decision aids may be more effective with problems that are more structured (e.g., Power, Meyeraan, and Aldag 1994) . However, typical ES applications address problems that are more structured than are DSSs since many of the programs emphasize actually forming the decision for the user whereas DSS work stresses a more informative role. These differing philosophies are attributable to the emphasis ES developers place on patterning an expert's reasoning as the best way to make decisions while DSS programmers are typically more concerned with helping users expand or clarify the way they view problems. Simon (1977) describes three phases of decision making: intelligence (searching for conditions that require a decision), design (developing and evaluating alternatives), and choice. ES programs are likely to be aimed at the 132/J-PART, January 1997 Symposium on Public Management Information Systems choice phase while DSS programs are likely to be aimed toward intelligence and design.
There is considerable ambiguity concerning ES and DSS differences. This is hardly surprising, given the diversity of the programs in these domains. Expert systems are more typical in relatively well-structured problems, but the technology is far more flexible than are traditional DSSs. The alleged differences are probably due more to the application than to the actual capabilities of the two technologies. ES writers have had an unfortunate tendency, in their glowing promises of potential benefits and completed applications, simply to dismiss as irrelevant computer-assisted decision-making studies in the mainstream MIS literature.
Many authors have investigated whether DSSs actually result in improved decisions (Aldag and Power 1986; Cats-Baril and Huber 1987; Christen and Samet 1980; Gallupe, DeSanctis, and Dickson 1988; Goslar, Green, and Hughes 1986; Goul, Shane, and Tonge 1986; Joyner and Tunstall 1970; Power et al. 1994; Sharda, Barr, and McDonnel 1988; Steeb and Johnson 1981; Turoff and Hiltz 1982; Ye and Johnson 1995) . It is not clear, however, how decision makers integrate an essentially rational component like a DSS into their sometimes irrational choice processes. How do decision makers commit themselves to a solution proposed by a DSS? How do decision makers justify agreeing widi a DSS suggestion when the decision maker must consider several reasons the solution might be rejected even though, on average, the DSS should improve performance? For example, decision makers should consider if the DSS is offering a solution outside its limited programmed expertise. This danger is especially relevant to an ES where system performance often is reduced drastically with just small departures from the programmed knowledge. There are situations where decision makers would have to overrule the ES, and it is expected that they would do so.
Here we investigate the relationship between decision quality, confidence, and commitment in a well-structured decision task assisted by an ES. If decision makers are not committed to their decisions, or are inappropriately confident, any objective improvement in decision making can be obviated by the realworld factors affecting confidence and commitment. For example, Christen and Samet (1980) found that decision makers who used a DSS outperformed unassisted decision makers, but because the assisted decision makers disagreed with DSS output their actual performances were identical. If computer-assisted decision making is to be effective, the amount of confidence and 133/J-PART, January 1997
commitment placed in a decision should be appropriate to the quality of that decision.
In this article we survey previous research on DSS decision quality, confidence, and commitment and propose a credibility model where decision makers use credibility factors to determine the level of confidence in and commitment to ES/DSS solution. After that we experimentally test hypotheses on the relationship between decision quality, confidence, and commitment as well as some of the real world factors that affect confidence and commitment.
PRIOR RESEARCH ON DECISION QUALITY, CONFIDENCE, AND COMMITMENT

Decision Quality and Decision Commitment
Understanding the relationship between the use of ESs and decision quality and commitment begins with the existing DSS literature. Despite significant work on the importance of commitment in other decision-making contexts there has been little empirical research on commitment to DSS decisions (see Bazerman 1990) . The study of commitment is a vitally important area of research because of the dieoretical and practical benefits in understanding how decision makers become committed and remain committed to a decision, even when that decision may be failing. An understanding of the significant factors and processes would help leaders to harness and preserve commitment and, conversely, to discontinue dysfunctional commitment to failing courses of action. Schwenk (1986) distinguishes between two types of commitment: commitment to a course of action and commitment to an organization or leader. This study examines commitment to a course of action. Using this definition, Staw (1976; 1984) found that more resources are committed when a project is failing than when it is successful. Some other factors responsible for an increased commitment of resources are whether a decision is selfterminating-less commitment-or not-more commitment (Staw and Ross 1978) ; whether there is social anxiety and an audience-increased commitment (Brockner et al. 1986 ); and whether decision makers perceive that the poor results are due to bad luck-lower commitment-or reflect negatively on themselveshigher commitment (Brockner et al. 1986 ).
Several behavioral explanations are offered. Whyte (1989) argues that many studies (Aronson 1976; Festinger 1957; Staw and Ross 1978) stem from the psychological need to justify past 134/ J-PART, January 1997 Symposium on Public Management Information Systems actions. A second approach uses cognitive science literature, arguing that commitment can be explained by the framing of decisions. Conlan and Wolf (1980) examine the relationship between the nature of the problem-solving task and the likelihood of commitment. They find that decision makers who use a "calculating strategy" to determine the causes of the failure of a decision tend to be less committed to a failing course of action. Prospect theory Tversky 1979 and was adapted by Whyte (1989) , who argues that the way risk is perceived by decision makers will affect how much someone remains committed. Undoubtedly, both the psychological and cognitive science approaches would apply to commitment and DSSs when decision makers can vary the ways they use a DSS, their reliance on it to determine a course of action, and how they eventually justify their decision when they are presented with contradictory information. The framework suggested in the next section will examine the relationship between decision commitment and decision quality when the decision maker is supported by an ES/DSS.
Decision Quality and Decision Confidence
A few experimental studies imply that there is not a positive relationship, as intuition would suggest, between decision confidence and decision quality from DSSs. Indeed, the research is quite mixed (for a summary, see Benbasat and Nault 1990) . There is still a tendency, though, to believe in the logic of a positive relation (cf. Power and colleagues 1994) . In some cases, DSSs improve the quality of decisions without a concomitant rise in confidence (Cats-Baril and Huber 1987; Christen and Samet 1980; Gallupe, DeSanctis, and Dickson 1988; Sharda et al. 1988) . Alternatively, where DSSs do not improve the quality of decisions, decision makers still have great confidence (Aldag and Power 1986; Goslar et al. 1986 ). Some authors find lower quality decision making with a computerized aid (e.g., Power and colleagues 1994). As mentioned above, Christen and Samet (1980) found that decision makers who utilizeed a DSS outperformed unassisted decision makers, but because the assisted decision makers disagreed with the advice given by the DSS the actual performance was the same.
In an experimental study on unstructured decision making that involves career planning, Cats-Baril and Huber (1987) partitioned the attributes of a computer into heuristics, interactiveness, and delivery mode (computer vs. paper). They found delivery mode had no effect on the productivity of ideas or the quality of decision making. Heuristics and interactiveness, however, did improve the quality of the decision while decreasing
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Symposium on Public Management Information Systems confidence. It is unclear whether the reduced confidence was due to the increased number of alternatives generated, the loss of control over the decision, or the inherently threatening nature of career planning. By dividing heuristics and interactiveness from computerization it is unclear what qualities are left to describe computerization other than the affective qualities associated with a computer (or DSS) . If the use of heuristics and interactiveness is an essential quality of DSSs, the Cats-Baril and Huber finding is consistent with the other research indicating the lack of a positive relationship between confidence and quality.
Research on group decision support systems (GDS) yields similar results. Sharda and associates (1988) found that groups who worked on a financial analysis model improved their decision-making performance by posting higher profits than did their unassisted competitors. However, no statistically significant relationship was exhibited between profits (quality) and confidence. Gallupe and colleagues (1988) also found that, despite the effect of increasing decision quality, the use resulted in decreased confidence. This finding is contrary to others, where DSSs tended to be associated with increased decision confidence (Steeb and Johnson 1981; Turoff and Hiltz 1982) . The system in the Gallupe experiment increased decision quality by increasing the number of alternatives available to the decision maker. Perceived confidence decreased, however, due to the perceived lower probability of picking the correct alternative because of the higher number of quality alternatives generated. Presumably, the number of alternatives was used by decision makers as a cue to how much confidence they should have in their decisions.
In a study by Aldag and Power (1986) , strategic decision makers who utilized DSSs had confidence in their decisions, but did not enjoy a corresponding rise in die quality of their decisions as measured by independent raters. According to Aldag and Power, "confidence was placed more in the process adequacy and problem-solving ability ratlier than on specific outcomes" (p. 585). Goslar and associates (1986) found neither the subjects' perceived confidence nor their performance level was affected by the availability of a DSS, the amount of data training, or the amount of available data.
This first wave of empirical research suggests that there is little prospect that either decision quality or decision confidence would automatically improve if decision makers were given DSSs. But this preliminary conclusion needs qualification. In addition to perhaps describing a behavioral phenomenon, this result may be due to different decision tasks and experimental designs. Many other factors can mediate the impact of DSS tools, Symposium on Public Management Information Systems such as the nature of the decision task and the DSS itself (Alter 1977; Gallupe et al. 1988; Yoon and colleagues 1995) or the usual organizational factors such as managerial support and end user involvement (cf. Gill 1995) . While this empirical finding is disappointing, further research in normative prescriptions for decision making may affect this curious result. Advances in hardware and software will allow improved system friendliness and fidelity to normative prescriptions, thus removing some of the confounding factors in determining if DSSs result in increased performance and an appropriate level of confidence.
In the meantime, however, a general theoretical framework is needed to examine the reasons for the disparity between the quality of decision making and decision confidence and commitment. A systematic examination of the factors that moderate their relationship would provide deeper insights into human machine decision making. Such a framework also could provide a method for cataloguing results and it could suggest new areas for research.
A Credibility Assessment of Quality
The belief that the results, suggestions, or solution of an ES/DSS in an intelligence, design, or choice process (Simon 1977) are acceptable necessarily involves intuitive decisions. This belief does not result exclusively from revisiting the activities in the various phases of decision making, because ES/DSS are designed to do this and probably do it much better than the decision maker. This may be especially true of task execution expert systems that handle very well-structured tasks and practically make the decision for the user (Coursey and Shangraw 1989) . Here the user does utilize his own decision-making model but is guided through the expert's model toward what is hoped to be a similar solution. While expert systems offer explanation utilities and other features to help the user understand the expert's reasoning, it is unclear how much a user really adopts the expert's framework. The development emphasis stresses validating and verifying the expert's decision model and involves the user only in training and encouraging him to use the system. The assumption is usually made that a user naturally will defer to the program since it represents the way an acknowledged expert would decide.
However, this assumption is questionable since the decision maker has relatively little involvement in the decision model and even may question the expertise or the appropriateness of the expert's advice in a given decision. Making a decision is seldom a singular process; it includes many decision subtasks (Weiss 1982) . These include decisions as to the accuracy of facts, the relevance of decision rules, and the conclusion that a sufficient amount of information has been gathered. Since a decision maker has less than perfect information, having relied on the expert's decision model, intuition will usually serve as a bridge for the information gaps that the decision matter must sometimes leap. Rather, this intuitive decision about confidence looks at credibility factors associated with the decision process. The decision maker will rely on these credibility factors to assess the amount of confidence and commitment to vest in an ES or DSS proposed solution at the choice phase.
Credibility factors are qualities or attributes which, when associated with a claim, immediately increase or decrease the credibility or believability of that claim (Bozeman and Landsbergen 1989) . They may relate directly to the quality of the information (e.g., how the data was collected) or they may relate rather indirectly through attributes of the data source and the medium (perceived expertise and neutrality, use of graphics, oral versus written presentation, difficulty in understanding data) among many others (see Bozeman 1986; Landsbergen 1987) . Credibility factors possess utility because their face value at increasing the plausibility of a claim is not based on a thorough model or explanation that shows how they lend credence to a claim. There may be an explanation, but this connection is taken for granted because of time, information, or other resource constraints. For example, if the decision maker encounters difficulty in the making of a decision, the decision maker may conclude it is a low quality decision and therefore have little confidence and commitment.
The problem for the decision maker is that it is not possible to make optimal decisions with problems such as missing, unreliable, or biased information. Therefore, decision makers must rely on these credibility factors to decide whether they should commit themselves to a decision. The credibility model has been used as an explanation for the perceived underutilization of policy analysis (Bozeman 1986; Bozeman and Landsbergen 1989) . Coursey (1992) found empirical evidence that credibility was influential enough to cause rejection of clearly optimal alternatives.
A program, whether it assists decision makers in the definition of a problem (intelligence phase of decision making), the identification of alternatives (design phase), or the final choice (choice phase) focuses entirely on the rationality of the decision model, algorithm, or incorporated process. Given a set of initial conditions for a bounded problem the program will yield a solution the decision maker can accept, reject, or modify. The
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Symposium on Public Management Information Systems difficulty occurs in deciding whether to commit to the solution and how much confidence should be attached. The decision maker can derive confidence and commitment by two routes. One way is to reflect on the model incorporated within the ES/DSS; because of cognitive or time constraints, however, the decision maker will probably supplement this route by utilizing credibility factors to arrive at a conclusion about the confidence in and commitment to the solution proposed by the ES/DSS.
In some cases, these credibility factors will be related to the rationality of the model or technique (e.g., sample size or the reliability of the data). In other cases, decision makers will see extrarational factors (the term rational is difficult to define, but here a decision is rational if it has a ratio or reason to support it). This reason would consist of a model or minimally of an explanation (Rescher 1988) . Given the plausibility of this framework, we will now discuss the hypotheses on the factors, including difficulty, that may affect decision confidence and commitment.
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES Decision Quality, Confidence, and Commitment
While many of these empirical studies involve ill-structured decisions, ES could aid decision makers to make well-structured decisions by relieving managers of technical, clerical, or computational distractions (Aldag and Power 1986 ) and by reducing variance in decisions (Sharda et al. 1988) . There is also the difficulty in generalizing across the various roles these programs take in the decision process. Here we focus on an expert system assisting in well-structured problems. Specifically, we examine the use of an expert system for a typical applicant evaluation for a budget officer position in a local government. This program was designed to actually make the evaluation decision based on an expert's interpretation of regulatory defined requirements, and dierefore it is considered a task execution system. The procedures and criteria are clearly stipulated by a real local civil service commission, and we ask if die ES helps decision makers do a better job when they evaluate applicants by these organizationally defined criteria.
Hypothesis 1: Decision makers assisted by the expert system will select a higher percentage of qualified candidates.
Gallupe and associates (1988) found, in a group setting, that a DSS acted as a memory repository, speeded up the necessary clerical work, and "provided a suggested structure to the decision
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The increased uniformity and quality, however, are potentially costly. A benefit is derived from the ES providing a memory repository and handling the calculations. However, such features reduce the incentives for the decision maker to personally model the information, especially when the program is to deliver the solution. No longer must the decision maker mentally retain information or the model of that information. Consequently, the ES may make it easy for the decision maker to withdraw from the decision process, reducing effort and commitment. Working with the ES may increase the quality of the decision, but the decision maker may be removed from the decision, thereby reducing the sense of responsibility. The result is a decline in the decision maker's commitment and confidence. When asked the reason for the decision, the decision maker has no justification because the model is captured in the ES/DSS. Here, the credibility factor, the "lack of an explicit model or reason" decreases the ultimate confidence a decision maker has in the final decision because the decision maker has little "internal justification" (i.e., justification related to the information itself)-We would expect, however, that the use of an ES would have factors that increase decision confidence and commitment. One of these credibility factors is the mere "face validity" (Aldag and Power 1986) . Given the conflicting reasons on the amount of confidence and commitment a decision maker could be expect to have in an ES decision, we test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: Decision makers assisted by the expert system will tend to display less confidence in and commitment to their decisions than will unassisted decision makers.
Hypothesis 3: Decision maker confidence and commitment will not be associated with decision quality (the number of highly qualified candidates selected).
If it is true that decision confidence and commitment are not directly affected by decision quality, then what are some of these credibility or real-world factors that may influence decision quality, confidence, and commitment?
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Decision Difficulty
In one of the first public administration experimental works on the effect of computers on commitment, Bozeman and Shangraw (1989) found that difficulty in accessing information results in reduced commitment. This result seemed to corroborate earlier findings by O'Reilly (1982) , Bozeman and Cole (1982) , and Allen (1977) on the importance of availability of information. Gallupe and associates (1988) also examined the relationship between difficulty and the level of confidence, but they argue that decision difficulty indirectly affects confidence and commitment through the quality of the decision. This idea relates to the belief that less structured problems, perceived as more difficult, are less successful candidates for ES and DSS assistance (Power and colleagues 1994) . In the framework proposed here, the decision maker cannot adequately assess the quality of the decision, since the model is relatively hidden. Rather, the decision maker uses difficulty as a surrogate measure for decision quality. As the difficulty of the decision process increases, the decision maker feels less confident about the quality of the decision process and consequently less committed to the decision.
Hypothesis 4: Among those using the expert system, decision makers who express difficulty with the decision process will have less confidence and commitment than decision makers who experience no difficulty.
Personal Involvement and Personnel Experience
If reduced confidence and commitment in a ES/DSS assisted decision can be explained by loss of control and reduced responsibility, it may be interesting to examine the factors that increase the perception of control and responsibility. When a decision maker is involved with the decision process instead of relegating many decisions to the ES, confidence in and commitment to the decision may increase. One factor that may draw the decision maker into the decision process is the influence of his personal information. When personal information is important in the decision process, we would expect decision makers to actively evaluate, in terms of their own experience, why an ES asks particular questions and whether these questions should be asked at all. Use of their personal information increases the decision makers' interest in the reasoning of the problem, and the decision makers begin to build their own models to justify the decision. This active interest in the process of model construction also could be expected where the decision maker has experience in the problem domain: in this case personnel management. Again, when the decision maker has personnel experience, we would expect decision makers to be actively engaged with the model incorporated into the ES.
Hypothesis 5:
The expert system effect of reducing confidence and commitment will be lessened as the decision maker uses personal information and models in the decision.
Hypothesis 6: When a decision maker has domain knowledge (personnel experience), the expert system effect of reducing confidence and commitment will be decreased.
The Use of an Explanation Utility
Some researchers have suggested that ES could improve decision making where the logic behind a decision algorithm is transparent to the user (Waterman 1985) . Developing expansion utilities would allow decision makers to involve themselves in the decision-making activity and to better understand the process. These expansion utilities will, upon request, provide more information to the decision maker. For example, the expansion utility may explain why a question was asked, tell where information could be found, or give explanations for key assumptions. Sharda and colleagues (1988) suggest that builders need systems that offer more power and flexibility to users by enabling them to better understand and modify model relationships. Implicit in this suggestion is that explanations of the model will improve decision quality and confidence. Ye and Johnson (1995) found a positive relation between decision quality, confidence, and use of explanation facilities in a small experimental study that reviewed twenty practicing auditors' evaluation of an ES's output.
Expansion utilities also could be viewed simply as vehicles to provide additional detail. Although they did not directly test the expansion utilities, Senn and Dickson (1974) examined the relationship between confidence and the level of detail supplied to a decision maker. They found that confidence was not affected by the level of detail. The information given to the decision maker, however, was not about the decision rules that were employed, but rather it was more detailed information to be processed. Schroeder and Benbasat (1975) found a very weak association between the amount of information requested by decision makers and the resulting confidence in their decisions. They also found, however, that decision makers in an uncertain environment tend to have highly varying information demands. With an expansion feature, the expert system may provide the decision maker with a personalized system, but whether this has no effect on perform-
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Hypothesis 7:
Decision makers who use an expansion utility will display more confidence and commitment to their decisions than those individuals who do not use an expansion utility.
METHOD Experimental Decision and Subjects
The experimental decision involved ranking the top three applicants from a pool of ten for a budget officer position in a local government, a classic rule of three determination. The experiment incorporated the actual documents, procedures, and criteria currently used in real personnel hiring decisions at a county civil service board. The decision was highly structured, with clear, legally required evaluation criteria (e.g., bachelor's degree in accounting or equivalent experience, "considerable knowledge of labor law and relations"). Since the design of the ES followed a paper-based system currently in use, an expert involved with administering the system was asked to validate design and results of the personnel system. Being mindful of the accumulated experience gained in the Minnesota experiments (Jarvenpaa et al. 1985) , a rigorous pilot test was conducted to improve internal validity. Ten individuals, four of whom were midcareer students with experience in personnel decision making, were asked to participate in the pilot study. Their comments, and the comments of four additional experts in personnel from state and county governments, were used to validate the realism of the materials and the selection process.
After this pilot test, 101 master's and doctoral students from four public administration programs (Alabama-Birmingham, Florida International, Ohio State, and Syracuse) participated in the research as an ungraded, in-class exercise. Students had various kinds of work experience. Some entered their programs directly from college while others were in continuing education programs. The subjects had a mean 7.8 years of work experience, with roughly half the participants reporting budgeting or personnel experience.
Treatments
Decision makers were randomly assigned to three treatment groups: a paper-treatment group (n = 38), an ES without explanation utilities group (n = 33), and an ES with expansion utilities group (n = 34). Subjects in the paper-treatment group were given a worksheet with the major criteria and calculations required to rank the applicants. Subjects in the ES treatment groups were given an ES using the same evaluation criteria, scoring system, and explanations utilized by the paper-treatment group. All decision makers were expected to apply a worksheet with evaluation criteria (quality ranking factors) to job candidates when they screened applicants for a final hiring decision. While decision makers in the paper-treatment group were free to work in any manner they wished, decision makers in the ES treatment groups were solicited systematically by the ES to complete the worksheet. For example, the decision maker would first be asked to rate, on the basis on the applicants' files, the level of budgetary experience and other minimal qualifications. The ES would inform the subject if an applicant failed to meet minimal requirements. If the applicant passed minimal requirements, the ES would move through the quality ranking factors and produce a final evaluation score for that applicant. These factors are a series of skills validated by detailed job analyses of the position, such as "considerable knowledge of the principles of accounting." The two ES treatment groups differed in that one offered the use of on-line expansion utilities. At any point in the working session, a subject in this treatment group could make use of an expansion utility by pressing a command key. The expansion utility would help the subject by explaining the meaning of a question, what information to look for, or where subjects could locate information in the applicant's file. The expansion utility also provided guidance to subjects on how they might score a particular quality-ranking factor by providing examples and typical ratings.
The information given to the paper-treatment group and the ES group without expansion utilities treatments were identical. The only differences between these two treatment groups were that some information appeared on the computer instead of on paper, and the decision maker was systematically cycled through all the ranking factors. The information, however, given to the ES group with expansion utilities differed due to the explanatory capabilities incorporated within the expansion utilities. In most of the analysis, where ES-assisted decision making was compared with unassisted decision making, the two ES groups were combined in order to increase sample size. The results of these analyses did not change when the two groups were kept disaggregated. The only time the two ES groups were separated was when the effects of expansion utilities were tested. ANOVA was used to evaluate the random assignment of subjects to treatment groups. There was no statistically significant difference among 144/J-PART, January 1997
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the groups as to computer experience (p = .74) and completion time (p = .24).
Experimental Protocol
Each subject received a packet that contained a pretest questionnaire; a candidate ranking sheet; a description of the decision task; a job classification description for the budget officer position; a copy of the job opening announcement; ten applicants' folders, each containing an employment application with supporting documentation; and a sheet of scratch paper. Subjects worked in a group setting, and each experimental session lasted approximately two hours. The subjects began the session with a pretest questionnaire to collect data on the control variables (e.g., age, attitude, education, personnel experience, computer experience, and so forth). They were given twenty-five minutes to complete this section.
After all of the subjects finished the pretest a brief statement was read, which described the purposes and objectives of the working session. The subjects had one hour and forty-five minutes to complete this part of the experiment. Because the rating system is automated for the ES treatment groups, the ESs also first briefly described the purpose of four function keys. Subjects utilizing the ESs were free to return to a previous question and change their answers or to completely restart their sessions. Upon request they also could receive assistance with program operation.
When subjects finished the treatment portion of the experiment and submitted a final decision, they were always handed a contradictory solution in order to determine decision commitment. This solution was presented as the actual personnel board decision. The subjects then were handed the first posttest questionnaire, which asked whether they would like to change or reexamine their decisions as well as how much confidence they had in their decisions. The subjects were then given the second posttest questionnaire, which asked about decision difficulty and included a memory test to determine which information was salient to the subjects and whether the subjects actively participated in the experiment. They had seven minutes to complete this final questionnaire. Subjects were then debriefed for their personal observations.
Measures
Two dependent variables were the focus of this experimental study. One binary dependent measure, commitment, records whether decision makers would be willing to change their minds if they were presented, with information contradictory to their expressed decisions. Staw and Fox (1977) have shown that commitment to a course of action is greatest immediately following negative consequences. Commitment, therefore, identifies those individuals who are definitely not committed to their decision. The second binary dependent variable, confidence, measures whether the subjects were confident in their decisions. This binary is a transformed Likert variable, which asked the decision makers to report how much confidence they had in the decision as compared to the decision "eventually made by the personnel advisory board." No significant differences in the results were obtained between diese two alternative measures of confidence. The binary measure results are reported for ease of presentation and understanding. Multivalued limited dependent variable models, like ordinal probit, that could be used for the ordinal case have rather complicated interpretations. The variable ES indicates the treatment groups (0 = paper; 1 = either of two ES groups). To test the expansion utility effects, the ES observations are categorized by expansion (1 = has expansion utility available, 0 = no expansion utility available).
Decision quality is measured as the number of candidates correctly selected by the subject, and correctness is defined as matching the top three candidates as determined by an expert in personnel decision making. This expert was a leading official in the county's personnel system, from which the experimental materials were derived, and had been instrumental in the development of the evaluation criteria for the position and of the expert system. While there could be some differences among expert evaluations of the applicants, our measure of decision quality emphasizes adherence to organizationally defined evaluation criteria. These criteria were developed using detailed job analyses, and they yield a very structured evaluation. Consistency in application of the criteria is an important element of decision quality. Additionally, it reflects the standard practice of building expert systems from one expert's knowledge.
Three different five-point Likert measures of difficulty were utilized. Decision makers were asked to report their difficulty in accessing information (how difficult it was to locate information on the candidates); in making a decision (how difficult it was to make a decision); and in working with the ES system (how much difficulty they had in working witii the quality-ranking factors).
Domain experience (in this experiment, experience with personnel) is captured by asking the subjects whether they make hiring and firing decisions or had substantial input into hiring and
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Influence of personal information includes not only personnel experience a subject might possess but any kind of personal information or experience that entered into the decision process. This was captured by asking the decision makers: To what degree did your personal experiences and background influence your decision? The measure was captured by an ordinal variable but was recoded as a dichotomous variable for ease of presentation. Results did not differ when the analysis used the original ordinal scale (1 = influenced by personal information; 0 = not influenced by personal information). Exhibit 1 shows the intercorrelation matrix of these variables. Ul/J-PART, January 1997
Exhibit 1 Intercorrelations of
RESULTS
Decision Quality, Confidence, and Commitment in ES
Hypothesis 1 holds that use of an ES is associated with a higher-quality decision. As exhibit 1 indicates, there is a significant positive relationship between the availability of an ES and choice of the top three qualified candidates (Tau B = .23, p < .01). Decision makers who worked with an ES did make higher-quality decisions.
Hypothesis 2 suggests that an ES should affect decision confidence and commitment. The hypothesis is that decision confidence and commitment suffer when a decision maker utilizes an ES. As indicated by exhibit 2, there is a statistically significant inverse (negative sign) relationship between availability of an ES and confidence and commitment. When an ES is available, the decision maker is less confident and committed to his decision. Hypothesis 2 is supported. Decision makers assisted by an ES displayed less confidence and commitment than those decision makers who were not assisted by an ES.
Hypothesis 3 holds that the increase in quality affects confidence and commitment. Decision quality, however, does not have a statistically significant Kendall's Tau-B correlation with confidence or commitment (for the ES-assisted group, n = 65; and see exhibit 1 for all subjects, n = 97).
The results suggest that ES can improve personnel decision making but may actually reduce confidence and commitment. Commitment and confidence, however, are not affected by decision quality. Organizations should not just supply a decision maker with an ES and assume that confidence and commitment will automatically increase along with the quality of the decision. 
Exhibit 2 Logit Response Model for Decision Confidence and Commitment by Use of ES
148/J-PART, January 1997
Symposium on Public Management Information Systems
Before a decision maker will successfully act upon a high quality decision, the findings suggest that the decision maker also must have confidence and commitment to that decision. If decision makers using an ES exhibit a negative relationship between decision quality and decision confidence and commitment, what factors can moderate or explain this negative effect?
Factors Affecting Decision Confidence and Commitment
Contrary to earlier research findings (Bozeman and Shangraw 1989) , decision difficulty was not a factor moderating decision confidence and commitment. This was true of all of die difficulties a decision maker might encounter: difficulty in accessing information, making the decision, and in working with the ES system. Whether a person reported difficulty with a decision or not, there was no effect on decision confidence or commitment. Even though decision quality was negatively correlated with difficulty (decision difficulty, exhibit 1), it did not prove to be a moderating variable between ES and confidence and commitment, the focus of this study. None of the logit response models were statistically significant (p > .10 with n = 65). Hypothesis 4 is not supported. These findings on decision difficulty substantiate the earlier findings of Christen and Samet (1980) , Gallupe and colleagues (1988) , and Weiss (1982) .
Hypothesis 5 suggests that when decision makers report high influence of their personal information, they have more decision confidence and commitment. Once decision makers use personal information, it is likely they will have some personal justification for the final decision. Confidence and commitment did vary depending on whether persons were heavily influenced by personal information (see exhibit 3). When decision makers reported low influence of personal information the use of an ES reduced confidence and commitment, as was previously found in testing hypothesis 2. The decision makers had low confidence if they worked with a computer and higher confidence if they worked on paper. When decision makers reported high influence of personal information, however, the effect was not statistically significant. This is evidence that the influence of personal information has a moderating role in counteracting the ES effect of reducing confidence and commitment.
Having domain experience (here, experience with personnel decisions such as hiring and firing) was also a significant moderating factor of ES upon decision confidence and commitment (see exhibit 4). When an individual had experience with hiring or firing, the use of an ES no longer affected confidence or commitment. If the decision maker, however, had no such experience, then the effect of the ES was strong in decreasing decision confidence and commitment. Hypothesis 6 is supported. One interpretation is that when the decision makers had domain experience or were influenced by personal information, this provided a justification for the decision makers when they were confronted with contradictory information, and thus moderated the effect of the ES in reducing confidence and commitment. Another interpretation is that these factors keep decision makers involved in the decision process, and when they are confronted with contradictory information they have confidence and commitment because they have worked with the information and may even have a model to justify the conclusion. The ES effect of 150/ J-PART, January 1997 Symposium on Public Management Information Systems reducing confidence and commitment also was moderated when decision makers had domain experience.
Finally, one of the attractive features of expansion utilities is that they can illuminate the algorithm underlying the ES. If this is the case, one would expect that the use of expansions would enable the decision maker to better understand the decision process. This increased understanding would make the model more transparent, involve the decision makers, and provide them with a justification to support the choice suggested by their ES. However, the logit model testing the effect of the availability of an expansion utility was not statistically significant in moderating the ES effect on decision confidence or commitment (n = 24, p > .10). Perhaps the results would change if the expansion system provided information on the decision model in addition to the information on the procedural aspects of the decision process.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Most people assume that the level of confidence and commitment should be appropriate to the quality of the decision. If one displays confidence and commitment to a decision this should indicate that one has a quality decision. This assumption, when it comes to ESS/DSS, is questionable based on this study and on previous DSS research.
Intuitively, it would seem that if an ES improves the quality of decision making, confidence should increase and there should be more commitment to one's decision. This study did find that an ES improved decision quality. However, as in past studies that focused on ill-structured decision tasks, this study found both the absence of a positive relationship and also a negative relationship between decision quality and decision confidence and commitment.
This result is troublesome. If ESs improve decision making without a corresponding rise in confidence and commitment, the theoretical advantages of an ES will remain unmet, since commitment and confidence in the decision is necessary. This is an especially important finding for government decision makers utilizing an ES, given their typical low confidence, risk-averseness, and the "gold fishbowl phenomenon" (Bozeman and Bretschneider 1986) . In some cases, commitment and confidence may be more important factors, given the difficulty of finding optimal solutions in public policy and management decisions (Appleby 1953) . The ES becomes a black box. The rationale for the ES suggested solution is no longer generated by the decision maker and so the decision maker does not have a justification for the decision when \5\IJ-PART, January 1997 confronted with contradictory information, thus reducing confidence and commitment. While the ES relieves the decision maker from the burden of computational and clerical detail, the ES also can reduce the incentive of the decision maker to model the information. No longer must the decision maker retain information or the model of that information. The decision maker merely punches in the numbers without actually thinking about what the ES is doing. Expert systems are claimed to help nonexperts make expert decisions. The model the expert uses is in the computer program. While some expert system writers claim educational uses of this technology, the overriding belief has been that the expert decision-making model can be invoked by lesser trained colleagues (Coursey and Shangraw 1989) . Here, we find that those with less experience in personnel may formulate the same decision using the expert's model, but they are not likely to be very confident with the results. When asked the reason for a decision, the decision maker has no justification, because the model is captured in the expert system. When decision makers are confronted with this contradictory information, this decreases their ultimate confidence and commitment to the final decision. Instead of appearing as reduced confidence and commitment once a decision has been made, this phenomenon may manifest itself as resistance to change, as in instances where decision makers would show unwillingness to trust a decision produced by a DSS/ESS by refusal to use such a system. We suggested a theoretical framework to organize previous work, the results of this study, and new lines of inquiry in order to explain computer-aided decision making. The central theme of this credibility factor framework is that decision makers cannot always step outside of themselves and judge the quality of their decisions when they work with an ES. Therefore, one cannot expect a direct relationship between quality and decision confidence and commitment. Rather, decision makers use indicators of the quality of their decisions. In some cases, these credibility factors have a logical relationship to the model or technique that is utilized by the ES. Some of the hypothesized intuitive indicators tested in this study include difficulty; the availability of an expansion utility; and involvement of the decision maker, which includes influence of personal information and domain experience.
In previous studies, difficulty was associated with reduced confidence. These findings were not confirmed. Difficulty was not a credibility factor that moderated the ES effect upon confidence or commitment. Heavy influence of personal information and domain experience, however, eliminated the ES effect of reducing confidence and commitment. Using the theoretical construct, influence of personal information and domain experience involves the decision maker in the decision process and thereby counteracts the black box phenomenon. Influence of personal information and domain experience help the decision maker to become a more involved, critical user of the expert system. Interestingly, when a decision maker reported high influence of personal information, the quality of the decision was not influenced, and presumably it can be inferred that this influence did not translate into bias. For subjects who were assisted by the ES, the Tau-B correlation between the personal information influence and the number of candidates selected correctly was -.09 (p = .41). The interpretation is that the level of personal information influence did not affect the propensity to pick the best candidates. When the decision maker uses the expert system, the decision maker can draw upon vivid personal experience without necessarily producing a biased result.
When a decision maker reported experience in personnel decision making, experience also tended to moderate the ES effect of reducing confidence and commitment. Experience with personnel decision making did not affect decision quality. The benefit of experience, in working with ESs, is not improvement of the quality of decision making, but rather the ability to adjust the level of confidence and commitment to control for the effects of the ES.
If domain experience is important to confidence or commitment, the casual or infrequent user may not exhibit the same level of confidence as do conscious users, because casual users do not have the necessary domain experience to adjust the level of confidence and commitment. Two interesting implications emerge from these results.
The first implication is for the hope that an ES/DSS can substitute for domain experience. Some managers hope for the day when computer programs can substitute for some areas of human decision making, as is certainly the case in expert system development. If domain experience or involvement is important, then the promise of a well-structured ES aiding the casual user may be threatened, at least as far as productivity gains through duplicating an expert's decision-making prowess. These experimental findings suggest that while ESs can improve decisionmaking results, the ES does not improve confidence and commitment where there is no domain experience. Further research is needed to focus on the implications for ESs designed for infrequent users. The second implication is for the role of the user's personal involvement with the decision process. One of the claimed benefits of the ES, especially in the public sector, is that it will enable decision makers to apply only objective criteria uniformly to all cases. If decision makers report that personal information influenced their decision process, this could be interpreted as bias. From the results obtained here, however, the influence of personal information did not affect decision quality (bias), but it increased the level of user involvement, confidence, and commitment in decision makers working with an ES.
The empirical results emphasize the importance of the user taking control, or at least believing that he has influenced the decision process, when computers are used to structure that decision. ESs may not help improve decision making unless they have mechanisms to continually involve the user in the decisionmaking process. This belief stems from the typical finding that users prefer written and verbal information over computerized sources (e.g., Zeffane and Cheek, 1995) . Builders of ESs should stress systems that encourage decision makers to become involved in the decision process rather than to allow decision makers to remain passive users. This would be more akin to the standard practice in DSS work. Currently most ES development emphasizes experts, knowledge verification, and validation issues. ES design could focus on some of the variables that proved significant in adjusting the level of confidence and commitment appropriate to decision quality (like personal information or domain experience-for instance, holding the user accountable through assignment of an identification number or asking the decision maker to append written comments in an ES session).
On a theoretical level, Johnson-Laird (1988) has developed the notion of mental models to explain the differences between what strict logic would dictate and what decision makers actually conclude. Namely, the logic found in logic textbooks is different than the logic used by decision makers. After conducting many experiments, Johnson-Laird concluded that decision making is not carried out through the application of a mental propositional calculus to a set of statements but rather through the examination of the correspondence of a claim to the decision maker's mental model of the problem domain. If there is an inconsistency between the claim and the mental model-whether that mental model is visual, experiential, or verbal-the claim is judged to be illogical. Like the rational model utilized in the experimental ES, many of the normative, prescriptive models utilized in ES are rigorous analytical models, clarifying basic assumptions and developing the logical implications of these assumptions. Yet if we believe the Johnson-Laird findings, decision makers would not exclusively judge the ES decision models through a testing of 154/J-PART, January 1997 Symposium on Public Management Information Systems the logic but through supplementing these judgments through the use of mental models.
While we would hope for a convergence of mental model and normative model solutions, it is not clear that the methods also should converge. Provision should be made for the decision maker to use personal information and experience to guide the decision process as well as to use the solutions suggested by an ES. In fact, ES designers may benefit from investigating how decision makers cope with the complexity of some decisions by using these credibility factors.
The central result of this study concerned the ES effect of reducing decision confidence and commitment. One interpretation of this finding was that the ES becomes a black box and that decision makers become less involved with the decision process when they are assisted by an ES, resulting in less confidence and commitment. Future research utilizing "process-tracing" (Todd and Benbasat 1987) should focus on this particular interpretation by measuring the extent to which noninvolvement occurs, under what circumstances it occurs, and how it leads to lowered confidence and commitment. The findings of this study together with the results of previous studies indicate that in a broad range of ES/DSS and decision tasks there is the lack of a positive relationship between decision quality and decision confidence and commitment. Further research should focus on tasks, unlike personnel selection, for which the computer is especially equipped (e.g., computing probabilities or forecasts). Studies of lessstructured problems and ES designed for different roles in the decision process are also vital.
